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Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues the study of mass politics is currently weakened by its separation from debates in social 
theory.  A preliminary attempt at reconnection is made.  The implications of an interpretative turn in social 
theorising are explored, and the interpretative perspectives of mentalism, intersubjectivism, textualism and 
practice theory examined in detail, in particular regarding how they and their equivalents in political study 
differ on units of analysis and how to understand one of the key social practices, language.  It is suggested 
that text- and practice-oriented perspectives are well placed to sidestep common difficulties of voluntarism or 
social determinism, the mysteries of individual consciousness, and the metaphor of language as medium, and 
that they offer rich and relatively unexplored possibilities for empirical study based on examining patterns of 
routinised behaviour, their evolution, and reflexive individual responses to them.  Arguments are made for 
their wider application to the study of mass politics, in conjunction with a number of compatible research 
methods. 
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Democracy is widely understood to entail at least some degree of political involvement on the part 
of ‘the people’.  Popular sovereignty, as the principle constitutive of this type of political 
arrangement, implies some level of engagement in the practices of collective self-rule.  It is hardly 
surprising then that, since the early twentieth century at least, the political dispositions of the 
citizenry in modern democracy have been a topic of considerable interest for the social and 
political sciences.  Yet how to study empirically these dispositions represents something of a 
puzzle, for the reason that ‘the people’ is a rather open idea that can be conceptualised in quite 
different ways.  To list just some, the object of study might be conceived as a certain aggregate of 
individuals, as a unitary collective, a communication system, an ensemble of practices, or perhaps 
just another piece of raw matter upon which material forces exert themselves.  The politics of ‘the 
people’, as an empirical phenomenon, has therefore been subject to widely different approaches.   
To a large extent the evaluation of these approaches must take place at the level of 
normative political theory.  Whether one chooses for instance to conceptualise ‘the people’ in 
individualist or collectivist terms must depend in large part on the kinds of political philosophy and 
attendant ideas of popular sovereignty and citizenship one wishes to endorse.  But debates about 
methodology are not purely a function of those about the right and the good.  They also hinge on 
competing ideas about the nature and significance of human bonds, the extension of regularities of 
behaviour, the nature and capacities of human action, and how to understand change over time – 
questions in other words which have perhaps been more central to debates in social than political 
theory.  To note this disciplinary ‘division of labour’ is not to suggest that it is conceptually 
grounded, since arguably there are common origins to the projects of social and political theory, 
and good reason to see the problems which they address as entwined (Wagner 2006).  It does 
suggest, however, that empirical approaches to the politics of ‘the people’ may be enriched by 
reconnecting them to a number of debates in social theory which arguably have been heeded 
insufficiently by the scholarly mainstream in political methodology.  These debates serve to 
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problematise some of the presuppositions with which a significant amount of empirical research is 
conducted, and to suggest a number of new avenues for investigation.   
This paper aims to explore some of the implications of debates in social theory for the 
empirical study of the political inclinations of ‘the people’, where this refers to the behaviour and 
dispositions not so much of those who are professionally engaged in or oriented towards 
institutional politics (politicians, civil servants, activists, commentators, and the like) but of the 
wider public as a whole.  One may conveniently describe the field as mass politics, encompassing 
the conventional sub-areas of political behaviour and public opinion, though the term should be 
read with an awareness of its potential drawbacks, notably the danger of a negative marking vis-à-
vis ‘elites’, and of the presumption of a high degree of regularity across citizens.1  The field takes 
in a variety of research agenda, with explanation (in various forms) and prediction conventionally 
the most prominent goals, but also involving social criticism and the identification of contingency 
and transformative potential. 
In reading the study of mass politics through debates in social theory, it may be useful to 
draw on a typology recently proposed by Andreas Reckwitz (Reckwitz 2002).  This begins with a 
basic division of social theory into classically modern theories on the one hand, which treat 
behaviour largely in terms of causal regularities, and late modern theories on the other, which 
emphasise the importance of human interpretation.  In the first category the two key approaches 
are the economic and the sociological, while in the second the paradigmatic approaches can be 
termed ‘mentalist’, ‘intersubjectivist’, ‘textualist’ and ‘practice-oriented’.  In what follows, we 
shall see these approaches can be linked to a series of analogous ones in the study of mass politics: 
the classically modern economic and sociological traditions find expression in rational-choice and 
norms-and-values approaches to political behaviour, while the interpretative perspectives of 
mentalism and intersubjectivism find expression in political psychology and deliberative 
democracy.  Text- and practice-oriented approaches are also present in the study of mass politics, 
though so far their adoption has been rarer.   
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Establishing this link to wider social-theoretical traditions allows a better understanding of 
the different positions occupied by approaches to mass politics on a number of crucial debates, and 
allows an exploration of the critiques to which these positions may be subject.  As one moves 
through the different traditions, it becomes possible to chart the arguments for a series of 
theoretical shifts, first from a focus predominantly on strongly determined regularities of behaviour 
(whether seen as a function of individual rationality or societal norms and values) to a greater 
concern with reflexive interpretation, and then from an emphasis on individual cognition to shared 
structures of symbolic meaning.  Further, one may discern the arguments for looking not just at the 
communicative possibilities these shared structures enable, but at the tacit knowledge and 
routinised action they are embedded in.   
Having explored the major trajectories of these debates, some of which have yet to make 
their presence fully felt in research on mass politics, the paper considers their implications for 
research methods.  The suggestion is that the enduring dominance of quantitative opinion polling 
does not reflect an equivalent ascendancy in theoretical discussion of the methodological 
assumptions that underpin it.  This invites discussion of a number of alternative methods, broadly 
associated with text- and practice-oriented perspectives, whose application could usefully be 
extended.  In a field where the greater part of research has tended to model itself on one scientific 
ideal in particular – generally, the verification or falsification of propositions – the full potential of 
empirical work to inform the development of new ideas has been realised only thinly, something 
these alternative perspectives may be well placed to remedy, albeit with sensitivity to certain 
enduring challenges.  While some such perspectives have their origins in critiques of the 
established approaches, their potential is nonetheless for a strongly positive contribution to the 
field, on the one hand by expanding the set of resources with which research is imagined and 
conducted, on the other by sharpening the claims that are made for it.   
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An Interpretative Turn 
 
For the purposes of overview, classically modern theories of the human world can be grouped in 
two broad traditions.  In the one, extending from the utilitarianism of the Scottish Enlightenment to 
modern-day rational choice theory, the individual’s pursuit of interest is taken to be the basic 
principle of human behaviour, and action is understood in terms of a purposeful, consequentialist 
logic.  Man is viewed as a rational homo economicus, maximising his ‘utility’ according to 
interests generally treated as unambiguous.  In the second tradition, regularly presented as 
antithetical to the first, and associated in particular with the work of Parsons and the later 
Durkheim, social structures are understood to be the basic ordering phenomenon, with action 
guided by a convergence of norms and values.
2
  Just like individual interests, these are treated as 
objectively given rather than subjectively appraised, and are taken to produce regularities of 
behaviour across the given unit of population, often referred to as ‘society’.  The behaviour of 
homo sociologicus is norm-oriented rather than purpose-oriented, but the significance of 
interpretation is again downplayed: in these classical sociological accounts, social order is founded 
on a normative consensus that permits little space for reflection and reappraisal (Reckwitz 2002).   
Both of these theoretical traditions form the basis for approaches to the study of mass 
politics.  Perhaps the classic rendition of homo economicus in the political-science literature is 
found in the work of Anthony Downs, who proceeds from the assumption of man’s instrumental 
rationality to elaborate a theoretical scheme intended to account for a variety of patterns of 
engagement and disengagement in mass politics (Downs 1957).  Based on the deductive method, 
and with a strong set of starting assumptions concerning how ‘rational man’ behaves, Downs’ 
theory does not lend itself easily to empirical study; nonetheless it has been influential for a 
sizeable body of research which looks at the accuracy with which economic interests can be used 
to explain political behaviour such as voting (Lipset 1959; Verba and Nie 1972).  Drawing instead 
on the holistic classical sociological tradition, a large number of authors emphasise the extent to 
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which mass politics is guided by societal norms and values.  Empirical research has looked at 
questions such as the changing values of western societies, or in the European context at the degree 
to which the populations of the EU member-states share common values such that one may speak 
of a ‘European identity’.3  Homo sociologicus, who acts according to the logic of appropriateness, 
is thus counterposed to his consequentialist cousin, setting off a string of debates about whether the 
individual or societal structure should be taken as the basic unit of an explanatory account. 
One of the major trends in latter-twentieth-century social theorising alerts us to the fact that 
these two traditions have rather more in common than their tendency to position themselves 
against one another might suggest.  Crucially, both approaches, by drastically underplaying the 
role of human interpretation and relegating the ideational to epiphenomenal status, exclude from 
view much that is indispensable to an understanding of the social world.  One can illustrate some 
of the difficulties this may lead to by looking at how these two approaches make sense of one of 
the most basic elements of political behaviour: voting.  The problems of a rational-choice 
perspective on voting have been well-documented.  Given that interests are essentially ambiguous, 
any ‘thick’ conception of rational choice which seeks to remove non-material factors altogether 
tends to fare badly, and empirical studies are often unable to avoid bringing in the interpretative 
dimension: ‘attitudes’ usually make an appearance as an ‘intervening variable’ to explain how 
interests guide behaviour.
4
  More fundamentally, even ‘thinner’ formulations of rational choice 
which, while maintaining the emphasis on utility, acknowledge the unpredictability of preferences, 
struggle to account for the willingness of large numbers of citizens to go to the polls at all in the 
face of the miniscule probability that their vote will be decisive (Green and Shapiro 1994; 
Friedman 1995).  Conventional cost-benefit analyses suggest that this expenditure of time and 
energy for such a remote chance of payoff hardly constitutes a ‘rational choice’ – yet many a 
citizen, whom these accounts assume to be rational, still votes on a regular basis.  Suggesting, as 
some have done, that the citizen’s decision to vote is rational because it maximises the satisfaction 
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that accompanies the performance of civic duties merely points attention away from the individual 
to the embedding milieu in which her sense of duty takes shape (Riker and Ordeshook 1968).   
Given that in order to account for why the act of voting should bring psychic rewards one 
needs a theory of the social significance attached to voting and of the emergence of expectations 
concerning good citizenship, this may seem to point to the superiority of a perspective more in 
tune with the model of homo sociologicus.  Citizens might then be seen as inclined to vote because 
of societal norms which cast voting as a civic duty (Knack 1992).  Yet such a perspective is 
severely problematic too, since the emphasis on regularities of behaviour is liable to obscure the 
variety of meanings attached to the act of voting, and the variety of reasons for which it may be 
pursued.  Voting may be understood variously for instance as a matter of expressing attachment to 
a particular political party, of expressing support for a particular representative, or of expressing 
appreciation for the opportunity to vote.  Considerable disagreement about the meaning of voting 
may be masked by any attempt to reduce it to the outcome of a normative consensus.  Likewise, a 
helpful approach to the study of mass politics should be able to make sense not just of voting itself 
but of the decision not to vote.  While rational choice may be too swift to explain this in terms of a 
short-term cost calculation, classical sociological approaches may be too quick to read non-voting 
as evidence of a shift in values away from the public to the private sphere, or the decline of norms 
of public engagement.  Such possibilities should not be discounted, but there is a danger that one 
overlooks the contrary possibility: that the decision not to vote is made precisely because of its 
symbolic significance as a divergence from commonly held expectations.  The politically 
important element of protest is crucial if one wants to understand acts of voting abstention: how 
people play with social expectations and use them for political effect is critical, yet is missed if one 
focuses solely on purported overarching norms and values as these are inferred from behavioural 
regularities, just as it is missed if one looks only for means-ends rationality.  The type of classical 
sociological approach is liable to be blind to the meanings attached to non-conformist behaviour, 
with the risk of marginalising individual agency and falling prematurely into social determinism.   
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For those whose goal is to predict human conduct, these concerns will be insufficient to 
warrant a re-examination.  One may feasibly enough state one’s main task as the search for 
behavioural regularities without inquiry into their origins, in the manner of the behaviourist 
tradition.  Such an approach, insofar as it produces suggestive findings and does not mistake 
regularities for imperatives, may have considerable instrumental value for the identification and 
response to large-scale trends: for the design of public policy, one might want to know for instance 
whether levels of voting abstention correlate with racial background and/or levels of income.  
Moreover, it may be that the heuristic application of rational choice or classical sociological 
models may usefully guide such research.
5
  However, the study of mass politics cannot be reduced 
only to the search for regularities, since there is much that such regularities do not reveal, indeed 
may disguise.  Nor do the models of homo economicus and sociologicus suffice as the means to a 
closer understanding of behaviour.  The recognition that these two traditions in fact have rather 
more in common than their mutual opposition might suggest provides the opening for a series of 
interpretative approaches. 
In social theory, the interpretative tradition sometimes goes under the heading ‘culturalist’, 
and finds extensive elaboration in the field of cultural sociology; but ‘culture’ is here understood 
not in terms of a tightly structured system of rules, in the image of classical sociological 
approaches, but rather with reference to the ideational resources for interpreting the world 
available to people as part of the social environment they inhabit and expressed in their practices 
of meaning-making (Swidler 1986, 2001b) (Wedeen 2002).
6
  Unlike in the reasoning of the 
individualist-consequentialist perspective, a certain accent is placed on the importance of 
transpersonal phenomena – with language often the most celebrated, but not the only, example – 
yet in contrast to the holism of traditional sociological approaches there is an emphasis also on the 
possibility of human beings actively to renegotiate their cultural milieu rather than merely be 
constituted by it.  The language of ‘identity’, with its implication of cross-spatial and cross-
temporal sameness, is abandoned or sharply problematised (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).  Perhaps 
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most generally, one can say that the human being is re-endowed with a basic level of reflexivity, 
and is no longer taken to be the passive agent of instrumental rationality or social structure.  One 
can speak of a new emphasis on the creativity of human action (Joas 1996).  For those interested in 
mass politics, this is likely to be a welcome shift, since it accords well with a normative concern 
for the principle of collective self-rule and the possibility of political change.   
Following the typology referred to above, it seems possible to find analogues in the study 
of mass politics for the interpretative social-theoretical approaches of mentalism, 
intersubjectivism, and text- and practice-oriented approaches.  The first of these, in which the 
ideational or symbolic world is conceived in terms of the structure of individual minds, finds 
expression in the field of political psychology, an approach to mass politics which emerged in the 
US in the early 1960s assisted by advances in the fields of sampling theory and psychology.
7
  As 
the self-description ‘psychological’ implies, the approach is strongly subjectivist and maintains a 
firm focus on the individual and that which is in the individual’s head: a conventional layout of 
key terms specifies the subject matter as beliefs (deeply held ideas), attitudes (general 
orientations), and opinions (expressly formulated views on a particular subject) (Kavanagh 1983).  
No strong a priori position is taken on what the contents of these mental states may be, but they 
are generally taken to be the key elements in a causal account of political behaviour.  In the words 
of one scholar, there is ‘a golden hierarchical assumption of the study of political behaviour: the 
idea that for every individual, his beliefs influence his attitudes, which, in turn, influence his actual 
behaviour’ (Bruter 2005, p.3).  While recent approaches in the field of political psychology have 
looked increasingly at how environmental factors outside the mind, such as the media or political 
parties, may influence the structuring of mental activity, and have shown growing concern with the 
role of emotion in political cognition and the processing of information, the approach still remains 
strongly individualist and, as we shall discuss in a later section, generally relies on research 
methods which require this.
8
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The second approach, intersubjectivism, has been linked directly to political study through 
the work of Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1984, 1989, 1990, 1996).  The model of deliberative 
democracy he proposes is informed by his (intersubjectivist) theory of communicative action, in 
which agents are conceived as expressing their individuality in the context of social relationships 
of communication (Habermas 1984, p.17) (Cooke 2003).  Rationality is central to this perspective, 
but now understood in terms of a social process of argumentation and reason-giving leading to 
enlightened and ultimately consensual opinion-formation.  Unlike in the models of homo 
economicus and sociologicus, the capacity of citizens to reappraise and revise their political 
inclinations in the light of reasoned social interaction is given emphasis.  As a normative model of 
democracy, the deliberative approach has by no means been elaborated always in an empirical 
mode, nor has it been addressed primarily to mass politics: indeed, its emphasis on a particular 
style of rationality has led to the charge of an inherent elitism (Sanders 1997).  But the feasibility 
of its claims has been the subject of a considerable body of recent research (Chambers 2003). 
Text- and practice-oriented approaches,
9
 in which the symbolic world is located in the 
meanings immanent to sets of routinised practice (with language usage a prominent one) also find 
expression in the study of mass politics (Wedeen 2002), though they have perhaps never acquired 
the mainstream status of political-psychological and, to a lesser extent, deliberative-
intersubjectivist approaches.  We shall refer later to a number of approaches informed by the ideas 
of social theorists, cultural sociologists and anthropologists such as Anthony Giddens, Clifford 
Geertz, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu.
10
  Such approaches tend to define themselves in 
opposition not just to the classical economistic and sociological theories but also to the two 
interpretative traditions mentioned, and so they will be outlined in greater detail when discussing 
below some of the substantive points of debate to have emerged in their encounter.  Like 
interpretative approaches more generally, they place emphasis on the symbolic world and the 
various kinds of knowledge which inform and constrain actors’ behaviour, but the accounts they 
give rise to are generally less universalist in their intended scope, and less oriented to the study of 
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causal relationships.  This points to the study of mass politics as a project of ‘thick description’, 
involving the analysis of the political implications of prevalent forms of practice rather than the 
search for law-like regularities and causal mechanisms that govern the social world as a whole 
(Geertz 1973; Schatzki 2002, pp.xi-xii). 
While it makes sense to link these three approaches together under the heading of an 
‘interpretative turn’ so as to underline their divergence from the models of homo economicus and 
sociologicus, this can only be a prelude to looking more closely at the points of difference between 
them.  Their shared concern to reduce reliance on non-interpretative approaches appears to this 
author quite valid, but some of the perspectives put forward in substitute have been shown equally 
susceptible to critique, with further theoretical divergences as the result. 
 
 
Units of Analysis: From the Individual Mind to Language and Practice 
 
The mentalist focus on the individual mind has been challenged by social theorists on a number of 
grounds.  A first question which arises is whether it makes sense to take the individual mind in 
isolation as an object of study, and to ascribe to it a causal status for behaviour (Schatzki 2002, 
1996).  From the perspective of intersubjectivist and textualist/practice-oriented approaches, this 
will seem a curious move, since it implies that mental states are independent of given situations 
and the social relationships and material phenomena of which these are composed.  According the 
mind this kind of transcendental status may seem redolent of the much problematised Cartesian 
mind-body dualism, a kind of secularisation of the Christian world-view in which the individual is 
reified as an independent unit so as to make sense of doctrines of free will and personal 
responsibility.  Even if one wants to set aside issues of consistency across contexts, and propose 
that in the given situation mental states do have a causal effect on behaviour (in Davidson’s terms 
that a person’s ‘holding a belief’ can be the explanation of their subsequent action (Davidson 
WHITE 
 12 
2001)), one will inevitably face difficulties concerning how to conceptualise the possibility that 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between beliefs and courses of action. An individual may 
simultaneously holds multiple beliefs which do not all point to the same course of action, or, 
precisely because they do point to the same action, it may be hard to associate that action with a 
particular belief.  Moreover, it may be that much behaviour has a routinised quality, and that the 
kind of knowledge which informs it cannot easily be expressed in the purposive, propositional 
form implied by a desire-belief model (Schatzki 2001). 
A second question posed to the mentalist perspective asks how, even if one takes seriously 
the ontological and/or methodological priority granted to the individual mind, one is to gain access 
to its contents.  The conceptual problems just noted reappear as epistemological ones: mental 
phenomena such as beliefs resist definitive description because they are underdetermined by the 
opinions which an individual articulates (Barnes 2001, p.17; Schatzki 1996, chap. 2).  One can 
infer as many beliefs as one wishes from a given stated opinion, rendering the reconstruction of an 
individual’s beliefs a matter of strong conjecture.  Furthermore, by probing them in a certain way, 
one is establishing a particular context, one that may influence the findings.  When an individual is 
asked to report his/her beliefs and reasons for action, the response is never a straightforward 
description but a ‘speech act’ in a new exchange, perhaps self-justificatory in its logic (Austin 
1962).  In advance of significant developments in cognitive science (the point would still be 
contentious) there is an unavoidably metaphorical aspect to any claim that an individual ‘holds’ a 
certain set of beliefs, and reason to be cautious about assuming a causal effect on behaviour. 
Arguably many of the challenges which have been encountered by researchers in political 
psychology are traceable to these problematic underlying assumptions.  A research question typical 
of the discipline in its formative years was the extent to which people’s beliefs and attitudes 
reproduce the coherent and stable ideological structures associated with elite opinion such as the 
left-right divide.  Philip E. Converse set as his object of enquiry ‘the nature of belief systems in 
mass publics’, defining a belief system as ‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the 
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elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence’ (Converse 
1964, p.207).  The important conclusion of Converse’s study was that, other than for those he 
termed elites (the top 10% or so), beliefs about politics tended to be unstable and weakly 
integrated: ‘the net result, as one moves downward, is that constraint declines across the universe 
of idea-elements, and that the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower’ 
(Converse 1964, p.213).  While this was a sophisticated study and its results were widely received 
as significant, it exerted an agenda-setting influence which was by no means entirely positive.
11
  
The approach relied on the strong assumption – again, metaphor one might say – that inside the 
individual’s mind there are attitudes and beliefs which (s)he carries around and deploys in like 
manner from one situation to another, regardless of the context, so as to form an opinion.  
Converse defined constraint in its ‘static’ version as ‘the success we would have in predicting, 
given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further 
ideas and attitudes.’ (Converse 1964, p.207)  Ideas and attitudes are thus described as though they 
come in a specifiable unit form, like the songs which make up a record collection, possessed or not 
possessed.  Having set up the question in these terms, and having discovered little in the way of 
such constraint in the course of his empirical study, the natural consequence was a polemical 
debate about whether ‘attitudes’ or ‘non-attitudes’ are the norm amongst non-elites (Converse 
1970).  Adhering to the terms of this debate, John Zaller was able to reach the conclusion that 
citizens perhaps respond to opinion polls according to whatever happens to be at the top of their 
minds:  his suggestion that they ‘make it up as they go along’ was successfully provocative (Zaller 
1992) (Sniderman et al. 2001, p.256).  The shadow hanging over the mainstream in political 
psychology has therefore been the lingering suspicion that, taking individual minds as the unit of 
analysis, the target of enquiry may be too amorphous to be worthy of study. 
Political psychology has evolved as a discipline, and most scholars in the field no longer 
seek the kind of over-arching belief system which Converse was looking for.  The more recent 
literature tends to downplay the possibility of global constraint (i.e. integrated beliefs across the 
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range of political issues) and to focus on domain-specific ideational packages structured not so 
much by sharply-defined ideology as by heuristics and schemae (Johnston Conover and Feldman 
1984) (Sniderman et al. 1991).  Yet the emphasis on the individual mind persists.  Partly one can 
link this to the political theory which underpins this approach, specifically its aggregationist 
conception of public opinion (Price 1992).  For as long as public opinion is conceived as the sum 
total of individual opinions, there will be the inclination to reify opinions, beliefs and attitudes as 
individual phenomena which are ‘in there somewhere’ so that there is something which can then 
be aggregated.  These have to be seen as acontextual, since absent the assumption that there is only 
one proper way for these to be formulated and described the logic of numbers would break down 
and the resultant aggregations would be meaningless.   
But more generally the difficulty is rooted in the individualist ontology this perspective 
maintains (admittedly a more interpretative one than that of homo economicus).  Albeit in the 
name of polling public opinion, respondents are questioned in private, are encouraged to make up 
their own minds without help from the interviewer or from acquaintances, and are guaranteed 
anonymity of response, all lest their answers be distorted in some way.  The goal is to minimise the 
intrusion of ‘context’ (sometimes referred to as ‘bias’ or ‘framing effects’).  When empirical 
findings do not invite unequivocal conclusions, it is often these situational factors which take the 
blame, resulting in more debate about whether ‘real attitudes’ are being missed because of the 
distorting effect of framing, and whether the attitudes which have been documented are not in fact 
‘non-attitudes’ masquerading as attitudes.12  These debates are forced upon the discipline by the 
problematic starting assumption of the acontextual individual mind as the unit of analysis. 
The difficulties of the mentalist approach seem to suggest the need to move away from a 
strong emphasis on the unitary individual.  To be sure, empirical research of considerable value 
may still be generated while adhering to this perspective: correlations between verbal statements, 
or between statements and voting patterns, may be richly suggestive, especially when used 
comparatively to flag up variations across time and space.  The language of beliefs and attitudes 
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will often be a natural one in which to make sense of empirical findings of considerable 
consequence.  Nor is it plausible to seek to dispense altogether with the idea of individual mental 
states: any interpretative approach which is not wholly determinist must make space for innovation 
and individual creativity, even if one avoids phrasing this in cognitive terms (Hollis 1994, p.196).
13
  
But an approach which gives centre-stage to the consciousness of the individual will inevitably 
have little to say about the underlying symbolic patterns and broader schemes of meaning into 
which putative mental states fit, and which may enable and constrain individuals in their opinion-
formation and political action.   
Clearly the answer cannot be simply to revert to holism in the manner of the classical 
sociological approaches mentioned above, with their emphasis on law-like societal norms, since 
this would revive the same tendencies towards social determinism.  Rather, it may be that it is the 
dichotomy of society and the individual which needs to be overcome, so as to enable a focus 
instead on what might be called specifically the social: the domain of transpersonal coordinated 
activity, where agents are linked by the mutual responsiveness required to maintain shared 
practices.
14
  Such a perspective allows one to ‘decentre’ the individual mind by seeing it as 
interdependent with wider processes of human interaction, whether one conceives these in terms of 
a transpersonal orientation to rationality, in terms of the disciplining effects of discourse(s), or the 
conventions of practice that interpersonal coordination demands.  By seeing the individual as 
drawing upon ideational resources or ‘repertoires’ which predate her and constrain the possibilities 
open to her, yet which she redeploys in new ways and whose reproduction she actively shapes, the 
voluntarism implied when each individual is conceptualised as constructing the ideational world 
from scratch can be avoided without reverting to a social determinist perspective which reduces 
the individual to the passive bearer of structure (Sewell 1992, pp.7ff).   
This move can be associated with both intersubjectivism and textualist/practice-oriented 
approaches, though these diverge in ways we shall examine.  One of the natural objects of study is 
then language.  The study of discourse seems to hold out the possibility of dissolving the 
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dichotomy of individual and society, since discourse plainly cannot be understood purely in terms 
of individual actions and intentions or collective structures: the sentence is not ‘owned’ by the 
speaker, since it requires borrowed vocabulary and grammar to be meaningful, yet vocabulary and 
grammar would neither exist nor evolve but for the incessant creativity of the speaker.  The 
speaker is both master and slave (Barthes 1982).
15
  In addition to this useful starting-point, a focus 
on language invites particular emphasis on the context in which opinions are formed, the process 
by which they are developed, and the meanings in which they are embedded, all of which are 
neglected in the mentalist approach.  It also invites sensitivity to a wider field of political 
behaviour than simply the ticking of boxes on questionnaires and voting slips.  Language is not 
however the only site of activity that one might want to explore empirically.  A wide range of 
social practices might be susceptible to examination, including patterns of cooperation and 
collective action, practices of conflict and conflict avoidance, or the enactment of local knowledge.   
Before looking more closely at the kinds of research programme for mass politics that 
might derive from a focus on the social rather than the individual or the structural-societal, let us 
look more closely at one of the key points of contention between intersubjectivism and text-
/practice-oriented approaches: how one should understand the nature of that social practice on 
which they are generally agreed is of notable importance, language. 
 
 
From Rational Communication to Presuppositions and Routinised Practice 
 
The classically modern theories discussed in the first section, and the mentalist approach discussed 
in the last, are based on an ideal-language perspective: they assume that there is no reason to doubt 
the possibility of a perfect correspondence between the phenomenal world and our descriptions of 
it, so long as we use language properly.  It is assumed for instance that ‘interests’, ‘values’ or 
‘beliefs and attitudes’ are susceptible to correct and incorrect description, and that through 
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empirical study the researcher may inch towards the former.  This is the logic of the scientific 
method, as derived from a certain understanding of how the queen of the sciences – physics – has 
progressed in the modern period (albeit an understanding which contemporary physicists might be 
wary of) (Murphy 1995).  The intersubjectivist approach, while according language a more 
privileged status than simply the medium of description, and while insisting that the individual not 
be isolated from the context of discursive interaction, maintains a similarly idealist perspective on 
the nature of language, and attracts far-reaching critique from text- and practice-oriented 
approaches for this reason. 
For intersubjectivists, language is the crucial means by which communication between 
individuals becomes possible and, of particular political significance, the means by which free 
public reason can be exercised (Habermas 1984, p.99).  The perspective is generally linked tightly 
to a critical-theoretical stance which emphasises the possibility of overcoming distorted views 
through reasoned debate.  It is assumed that discursive interaction which is free and fair will 
produce a rational consensus on truth – perhaps even that such a rational consensus can be defined 
as that which emerges when conditions for free and fair discursive interaction are achieved 
(Habermas 1990).
16
  Where these conditions fail, it is assumed to be for empirical rather than 
theoretical reasons.  The possibility of language to express a universal form of reason is axiomatic.  
Text- and practice-oriented approaches, on the other hand, abandon the ideal-language perspective.  
Meaning is taken to be rooted in language usage, and there can be no comprehensive system of 
rules by which to regulate uniformity of usage since rule-following requires interpretation, and 
depends ultimately not on theoretical propositions but on the practical know-how of competent 
actors.  Meaning is possible not because there is a universal grammar which anchors language 
practice, but because language-users tacitly ‘know how to carry on’ based on – though never quite 
reducible to – their cultural familiarity with like situations (Schatzki 1996).17  In this view, treating 
language as purely a medium is to severely downplay the significance of routinised practice and 
the taking-of-things-for-granted.  As James Tully has emphasised, drawing on the insights of the 
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later Wittgenstein, not everything on the basis of which people think, argue, and act as they do can 
be justified (Tully 1989, p.181).  There is always a point at which justifications are exhausted, 
when bedrock is reached and ‘my spade is turned.  Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I 
do’ (Wittgenstein 1976, §217).  Indeed, it is precisely the impossibility of shaking off all features 
of particularity, and the rootedness of speakers in conventional practices, which establishes the 
‘rough ground’, as Wittgenstein calls it, upon which discursive endeavours like communication, 
deliberation and opinion-formation can be achieved.  It is therefore the tacit dimension (Polanyi 
1967) that deserves particular attention as one examines the social world, since it is here that the 
terms of debate are set, and where the constraints on political change may be found.   
This fundamental point of disagreement notwithstanding, both intersubjectivism and text- / 
practice-oriented perspectives are attractive for the study of mass politics in that they direct 
attention towards phenomena which are readily susceptible to empirical exploration rather than 
towards the invisible phenomena of the cognitive realm.
18
  Both might take for instance an 
everyday discussion on matters of political relevance as their object of study, with the discursive 
interaction itself rather than the individuals party to it as the principal point of interest.  But the two 
approaches then point research in different directions.  Intersubjectivists, insofar as they follow a 
Habermasian critical agenda, will want to examine how closely the interaction approaches the 
deliberative ideal.  Of importance for them will therefore be questions to do with how the 
discussion evolves, the extent to which preferences seem to change in the course of discussion, the 
validity of the reasoning strategies adopted, the kinds of consensus which emerge, and the extent to 
which the opinion generated can be said to be of better quality than that which emerges from 
traditional polling.  Text- and practice-oriented perspectives on the other hand will be more 
concerned with the unintended and tacit aspects of the discussion, and their enabling and 
constraining effects.  There may be less focus on opinions as such and more on the common-sense 
assumptions which underlie these and which, by restricting the sphere of agreement or 
disagreement to a manageable size, make possible the exchange of views.  Researchers may 
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explore the kinds of topic brought up in conversation, the reference-points invoked in their 
discussion, the usage of key concepts, and the assumptions made about political agency.  Also, 
rather than seeing the discussion as the achievement of distinct individual subjects, they will be 
interested in the kinds of subjecthood the discussion makes possible: the ‘I’s’, ‘we’s’ and other 
roles or ‘subject positions’ routinely invoked, the power-political implications of these, the 
different patterned discourses in which these are embedded, and the contradictions which arise as 
different discourses are drawn upon.  Researchers may be interested in silences or bodily 
expressions, including mannerisms of deference or authority, and the acceptance or rejection of 
these.  Stepping back from the particular case, they may also want to explore how far such 
discussions are naturally occurring in everyday life, and the situational factors which may hinder 
or facilitate them. 
 
 
Implications for Research Methods 
 
The opinion poll or survey has generally been the research method of choice for those studying 
mass politics from the perspective of classically modern theories or the more interpretative 
individualism of political psychology.  It is the logical operationalisation of the assumption that 
individuals and/or their mental features can be considered in isolation.  Insofar as the link we have 
made to certain debates in social theory suggests the need to be cautious on this, what does this 
imply for the method itself?  Certainly there need be no automatic association between 
methodological or ontological individualism and quantitative methods, and while quantitative 
polling methods have a natural affinity with aggregative approaches (since both prioritise the 
numerical) this association could in principle be weakened.
19
  The polling method might be used 
with a view not so much to revealing what are taken to be the respondents’ context-independent 
preferences, beliefs or values, but so as simply to explore what responses they are prone to give to 
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particular questions, and how these correlate with other responses or behavioural tendencies.  The 
method can also be used to seek such patterns at a collective level, thus bypassing the problem of 
unstable dispositions at the individual level (Page and Shapiro 1992).  One does not have to 
assume, in other words, that the propositions on which answers are given correspond to discrete 
idea-elements in the heads of respondents. 
However, not only would the necessity of such a move probably be disputed by most 
scholars in political psychology, but there are problems with the polling method which are not 
easily overcome.  Survey questionnaires have justifiably been criticised as instruments of power, in 
the sense that they presuppose which are the important questions to be asked, and may indicate to 
the respondent what an appropriate answer might be.  They also remove from the researcher’s 
view much of the most interesting material – the process of engagement with a question, the 
meanings attributed to its vocabulary, the hesitations, the indifference, the side-comments, 
discussion with others, and variation in discussion across contexts.  Opinion polls and related 
quantitative approaches are not designed to study contextual interaction; quite the contrary, the 
point of using polls is usually to neutralise the importance of situational cues and thereby get at the 
supposed pre-interactional attitude, belief (etc.) as directly as possible.  Furthermore, aggregative 
approaches based on opinion polling can be insensitive to differences in the relative importance of 
different political issue areas, and to differences in the relative importance of the opinions of 
different individuals or groups (for famous critiques, see (Blumer 1948; Wright Mills 1940; Taylor 
1994; Bourdieu 1979; Adorno 2005)).  Whilst innovations in method – including the use of pre-
poll interviews – can to some extent alleviate the first of these blind-spots, the second is bound up 
in the logic of random sampling, the point of which is to be blind to such differences.  This may 
indicate a need to move away from strong reliance on numbers-based research methods based on 
the aggregation of individual units. 
One of the standard defences given of opinion polling is that, for all its faults, it still 
usefully mirrors the mechanisms which are employed as part of the democratic process to ‘capture 
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public opinion’: electoral voting and referenda.  These latter are also based on the principle of 
aggregation and the secrecy of ballot, and those who criticise polling are therefore close to 
criticising the democratic process itself.  There is indeed some truth in the idea that the two are 
linked: one can plausibly imagine that, in liberal democracies, a certain conception of public 
opinion is reified so as to give meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty, and that polling is 
embraced as another means to lend solidity to this.  Hence what Blumer called ‘the narrow 
operationalist position that public opinion consists of what public opinion polls poll.’ (Blumer 
1948, p.543)  And for as long as this conception of public opinion remains institutionalised in 
democratic voting arrangements, opinion polls undoubtedly will be important tools of research.  
However, even if one sets aside their normative role in sedimenting what is ultimately a 
problematic conception of public opinion, they should not be accorded a special status, not least 
since they are erratic as predictors of political behaviour and since their findings may be of 
ambiguous significance.  To pick one example, in March 2005 the polling organisation 
Eurobarometer released figures suggesting that 48% of the French population and 63% of the 
Dutch population were in favour of the EU Constitutional Treaty, with 17% and 11% against it 
respectively.  It moreover suggested that these high levels of support corresponded to a high level 
of knowledge about the Treaty, with the populations of both countries featuring in the top five of 
the EU-25 on this measure (Eurobarometer 2005).  The results of the referenda a few months later 
were rather different of course: 55% of the French vote and 62% of the Dutch was against.  
Although it is quite possible that ‘public opinion’ changed rapidly in the intervening months, or 
that the referenda themselves failed to capture that opinion, both possibilities raise strong questions 
about exactly what it is that is captured at any one moment and aggregated.   
Shifting away from the purely mentalist perspective points to a number of possible 
alternative research methods.  Emerging predominantly from the intersubjectivist tradition, 
‘deliberative polls’ and citizens’ juries, in which participants are convened in a group environment 
and provided with informational resources with which to enrich a debate about policy proposals, 
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are a well known and promising substitute for individual polling, even if one remains ambivalent 
on whether rational consensus can or should be the expected outcome of such exercises.
20
  There 
are also a number of interesting possibilities for studying, more in the text- and practice-oriented 
tradition, the ideational resources available in a given society, how people engage with and adapt 
these, and what the political implications may be.  Group discussions again provide a useful 
setting: in contrast to one-to-one interviews, the role of the individual interviewee’s whimsy in 
setting the course of discussion may be curtailed, since each is accountable to others for what they 
choose to talk about, and that which is collectively deemed inconsequential is likely to be drowned 
out in discussion.
21
  Group discussions, both convened and naturally occurring, provide the 
opportunity to examine what ideas are invoked spontaneously by participants in the absence of a 
structured questionnaire, and how these are handled and interpreted in mutual coordination.
22
  This 
then enables the application of a range of analytical techniques.  Frame analysis and discourse 
analysis can be used to look at the ideational tropes or ‘interpretative repertoires’ which enable and 
constrain actors in their political discursive practice, at the construction of collective subjects, and 
at a range of acts of legitimisation and delegitimisation.
23
  Drawing on cultural sociology, the study 
of ‘symbolic boundaries’ provides a further perspective from which to analyse how the routinised 
invocation of ideational resources can produce collective subjects of political significance (Lamont 
and Molnár 2002).  Modes of justification represent another important subject of enquiry, for 
which the work of social theorists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot is of particular relevance.  
Following their exposition of the different ‘orders of worth’ by the logic of which justificatory 
arguments can be made, and on which some degree of tacit agreement is required in order for 
conflicts of opinion to be adjudicated, one may explore how these are invoked in the 
conversational context (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; Lamont and Thévenot 2000).
24
  For all such 
topics of analysis, which become of particular significance as one shifts away from a focus on the 
individual mind to sites of social activity, the study of group environments is superior to the use of 
survey questionnaires. 
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In addition to the study of artificially convened discussions, participant observation 
represents a valuable research method because it allows the researcher to explore not just political 
engagement but political withdrawal, and the sense in which this is pursued.  In the context of a 
downward trend in voting turnouts across western democracies, this focus on how the practices of 
everyday life may carry depoliticising effects seems of particular significance, and is a question on 
which conventional research methods are weak because they immediately direct the respondents’ 
attention towards matters political.  Nina Eliasoph provides an impressive demonstration of the 
application of participant observation in her study Avoiding Politics, exploring how, in certain 
social situations, norms of etiquette are used to render inappropriate the discussion of political 
topics.  Furthermore, invoking Erving Goffman’s distinction between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’, 
she explores how people in private contexts may feel fully able to articulate collective interests 
whilst in public contexts may feel constrained to adopt the more parochial language of a particular 
‘identity’.  Her approach highlights the importance of social norms for understanding how political 
participation emerges or fails to emerge, yet by looking at how these norms vary across contexts 
and how they rely on individual choices for their maintenance, she avoids resurrecting the passive 
figure of homo sociologicus (Eliasoph 1998) (Cf. (Cramer Walsh 2004)). 
 
While acknowledging the insights such approaches can produce, some scholars trained in 
quantitative methods will no doubt retain concerns about the scientific status of such findings.  It 
may be suggested that while qualitative research of this kind can lead to interesting new ideas and 
theories, ultimately it falls to quantitative approaches to establish their genuine significance, thus 
pointing to a methodological division of labour between qualitative ‘discovery’ and quantitative 
‘verification’.  Perhaps those sympathetic to Popper’s critique of early positivism will prefer to 
speak of falsification rather than verification, but the implication would be much the same.  In 
response, many qualitative researchers might argue that such a separation of tasks is not easy to 
maintain, even if one accepts the objectivist perspective implied.
25
  Their commitment to studying 
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meaning in context is not easily replicated using quantitative methods such as opinion polls, since 
the very attraction of the latter is that they allow the rapid accumulation of data without recourse to 
close observation.  What is ‘verified’ or ‘falsified’ may therefore not be the same as that which 
was ‘discovered’ by alternative methods, and many questions of interest to qualitative researchers 
relating to important but abstract concepts such as power may resist the formal ‘operationalisation’ 
required by verificatory quantitative research.  The matter is complicated further by the fact that 
many qualitative researchers will be sympathetic to Quine’s suggestion that theories are under-
determined by empirical data (i.e. that the implications of new findings are never clear-cut) and 
therefore that strict notions of verification or falsification are misleading (Quine 1951). 
Rather than a division of labour which sees quantitative methods as the underpinning of the 
scientific enterprise, arguably what is needed is a variety of approaches whose findings are then 
placed in dialogue.  Insofar as text- and practice-oriented theoretical approaches abandon an ideal-
language perspective and a search for the one true description as the purpose of scientific research, 
they do point to a certain pragmatism and pluralism, discouraging the researcher from a 
methodologically missionary stance which seeks to convert all scholars to a single approach.  
Methods should be judged then not according to which corresponds unambiguously to ‘the facts’, 
or according to their capacity to test a theory conclusively, but according to the types of research 
project they make possible and the extent to which they offer new ways of conceiving and tackling 
research problems.  Quantitative methods will retain important uses, such as to study declarations 
of voting intention (as above) or levels of knowledge on a specific topic, and adherents of 
quantitative and qualitative methods will benefit from a disposition of mutual curiosity.  Just as 
dismissal of competing methods is ill-advised, so there is little to be gained from the veneration of 
a particular method, styling oneself e.g. a ‘frame analyst’ as opposed to a ‘discourse analyst’, as 
though such terms each implied a clear, distinct and settled activity.  Such fields should instead be 
treated as providing useful indications of how relevant research might be undertaken, to be 
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engaged with rather than blindly followed.  In the words of Alexander Pope, ‘fools admire, but 
men of sense approve’ (Pope 1973 Part II, l.190).   
 
 
A Few Enduring Problems 
 
By making a connection between empirical social science in the field of mass politics and a 
number of debates in social theory, the previous sections have underlined the larger significance of 
some of the theoretical and methodological choices researchers need to make, and have indicated 
where a reappraisal of approaches may be necessary.  At the end of a chain of approaches, as if in 
the position of ultimate insight, we have placed the text- and practice-oriented strands of a wider 
‘interpretative turn’.  The attraction of these approaches lies in the opportunities they provide for 
sidestepping the slide into voluntarism or determinism, in their willingness to seek the symbolic 
world in observable rather than cognitive phenomena, and in their avoidance of a reduction of 
language to the medium of conscious communication, focusing instead on its unintended and tacit 
aspects, and the political effects of these.  But so as to dispel the implication that these approaches 
mark the end of theoretical debate, it may be as well to examine some of the challenges which they 
leave remaining. 
 Abandoning the notion of an ideal representational language reaffirms the embeddedness of 
the researcher in the social world – a principle which has become a familiar one in contemporary 
social science.  In contrast to a certain reading of the science of physics, the researcher is not 
assumed to be the detached observer of facts.  An alternative perspective presents new challenges 
however.  Consider for example the empirical question of how one might go about identifying a 
‘discursive resource’ or a ‘practice’ with a view to assessing its political implications.  The 
researcher needs to balance two competing demands: there is the need on the one hand to be 
sufficiently alien to the subject matter in question so as to be ‘struck’ by its distinctive features (the 
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danger being that the researcher takes these for granted just like the actors themselves, and is 
therefore unable to discern and analyse them) and yet there is the need also to be sufficiently 
embedded in the subject matter as to be able to interpret and make sense of what is found.  It is 
possible to alleviate the one danger (e.g. by conducting research in locations where one is 
‘culturally foreign’) only by accentuating the other, and either such move will have implications 
for the number and the kind of resources and practices considered worthy of record (Turner 1994, 
pp.19-24).  Moreover, the extent to which these competing demands have been successfully 
balanced is not something which the researcher is in a position to assess: ultimately this judgement 
must fall to the research community as a whole, whose members he or she must seek to persuade. 
 This raises the matter of by what criteria superior and inferior accounts of the social world 
are to be distinguished.  If one conceives the researcher as an interpreting actor who depends on 
skills of perception and sense-making, and the research community as second-order interpreters, 
there may be difficulties in relying purely on naturalist notions such as intersubjective reliability.  
Certainly there may be cases where studies and findings can be usefully replicated by secondary 
researchers, but there may also be cases where interpretations are contestable and where the desire 
for scientific consensus would restrict insights to the level of the banal.  Nor can the coherence of a 
representation be treated as an indicator of its superiority, since many cultural ensembles will 
include contradictory elements that no sophisticated account may ignore (Geertz 1973).  A more 
plausible argument, as concerns text- and practice-oriented approaches, holds that the mark of a 
high-quality reading of the social world is that it opens up new ways of posing and engaging with 
research problems.  It makes convincing sense of the empirical material at hand, and in addition its 
methods and concepts show themselves promising, perhaps with some amendment, for application 
to new sets of material.  Often it will draw further credibility by resonating with the findings 
achieved by other methods, and thus may usefully be probed with these, even if not confirmed or 
refuted.  Ultimately, the study’s success in achieving sustained support from a reflexive audience 
is also like to be important (Kratochwil 2007).  But these points notwithstanding, taking 
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hermeneutical ideas seriously does mean accepting that to demonstrate a given reading’s 
superiority beyond reasonable dissent may not be possible, and therefore that disputes about its 
contribution may be ongoing. 
The researcher who wants to make claims for the wider significance of her findings will 
also face the challenge of how best to think of the empirical data she draws out: as embedded in a 
larger grammatical structure (a parole embedded in a langue, in Saussure’s terminology), or as 
simply one of several utterances or practices bearing a resemblance to one another but not 
structured by a larger whole?  If the former, then how does one study grammatical structures when 
all one can access are particular utterances – how does one derive the nature of the category from 
the item? – and how does one give these verbal rendition?  If the latter then what is it that allows a 
connection between utterances to be made; how does one generalise one’s findings?  Many 
discourse analysts and practice theorists describe themselves as post-structuralist and reject the 
idea of grammars (Potter and Wetherell 1987, p.173; Davies and Harré 1990).  Whilst this is a 
coherent perspective, it makes difficult something which can often be of great interest in the 
analysis of any given empirical situation: that is, consideration not just of what was said or done 
but of what was not said or done, yet might well have been given the patterns of action culturally 
familiar to the relevant actors.  When Boltanski and Thévenot adopt the term ‘grammars of worth’, 
it is precisely this possibility which they enable, albeit at the risk of reifying structure once more.    
Next, one may need to think about the extension of the repertoires and practices one 
identifies, i.e. how best to describe the set of people who take them up.  Here one encounters the 
old problem of ‘groupism’, whereby one is tempted to infer arbitrarily that the boundaries of the 
circle of repertoire-users correspond to the boundaries of a recognisable group.  The problem is 
more fundamental than methodological nationalism (Chernilo 2006), since it arises with regard to 
units other than the nation, whether it be cities, ethnic groups, professions, or sexes.  Clearly one 
wants to avoid linking the use of particular discursive repertoires with a pre-defined collectivity, 
both because a neat overlap of this kind is empirically implausible and because for normative 
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reasons one wants to avoid arriving at a perspective which does not allow for the possibility that 
individuals may renounce some of the patterns with which they are confronted.  To some extent it 
may be possible to circumvent the difficulty by means of careful phrasing of research goals and 
conclusions, so that one studies for instance the uneven territorial distribution and ‘availability’ of 
discourses and practices rather than their adhesion to particular social groups (Lamont and 
Thévenot 2000, pp.6-9).  It is likely though that language itself makes some kind of problem 
unavoidable, since whatever noun ones uses to describe the participants to an empirical study will 
imply some act of inference to a larger population.  A combination of cautiously phrased and 
consistently problematised generalisations probably represents the most sensible means by which 
to continue empirical research in the face of this challenge. 
Finally, while a focus on the social rather than the individual or the societal may allow one 
to avoid binary thinking on the structure-agency problem, the problem itself does not fully 
disappear.  Swidler’s suggestion that culture be understood as a ‘toolkit’ represents a move away 
from the social determinism associated with seeing culture as determinative of values.  Humans 
can be understood then as active ‘problem-solvers’ rather than as passive bearers of structure, but 
without sliding to the polar extreme of the radically autonomous individual since they work within 
the constraints of their inherited cultural resources.  Similar considerations are undoubtedly behind 
several of the approaches we have considered.
26
  Yet arguably none of these approaches is able to 
give a satisfactory account of how such a process of strategic choice between possible lines of 
action works.  In particular, there is a danger that, in presenting actors as consciously able to select 
different frames, resources or repertoires of action according to whatever goals they wish to 
realise, one reverts on the one hand to means-ends rationality and a disembedding of the actor, and 
on the other one resurrects the idea of a meta-language in which competing options are constituted, 
evaluated and selected.
27
  One risks sacrificing the possibility that the cultural configurations of 
which people are a part shape their motivations and attachments to certain goals more than they, as 
‘toolkit users’, are able to say.  These difficulties can be avoided if one abandons the attempt at 
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causal explanation, which is at the heart of the structure-agency problem, but it is a move which 
many are naturally reluctant to make. 
Drawing these strands together, one sees the extent to which future work in the field of 
mass politics needs to remain connected to social-theoretical debates.  Neither a retreat to naïve 
empiricism, nor a conscious limitation of the research agenda to those topics deemed susceptible to 
naturalist approaches, are adequate means by which to escape these challenges.  On the contrary, 
there is a sense in which empirical researchers are particularly well-placed to contribute to the 
advance of these debates, since the challenges emerge most sharply in the context of practical 
research problems.  Theoretical debates are usefully disciplined by the experiential knowledge of 
seasoned researchers.  Yet such an outcome requires continued theoretical self-awareness.  What 
one takes to be a research problem depends itself on one’s theoretical presuppositions, and there 
should be no expectation of general principles of good method that can be applied mechanically 
without sensitivity to broader questions of the kind discussed.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The general aim of this paper has been to point to some of the arguments with which researchers in 
the field of mass politics may enrich the consideration and justification of their theoretical and 
methodological choices.  This has been coupled with the more specific aim of offering a corrective 
to the dominance of certain approaches.  The suggestion has been that too much work in this field 
is weakly attentive to the significance of how people interpret the political world, while to the 
extent this question is explored it tends to be from a strongly individualist perspective.  Given that 
the arguments for doing so are inconclusive, new lines of research are needed.  In particular, text- 
and practice-oriented approaches promise to cast light on the routinised, taken-for-granted aspects 
of human action which other perspectives generally exclude from view or which they solidify as 
WHITE 
 30 
law-like norms, and may therefore at the very least be a valuable complement to the growing 
intersubjectivist literature associated with deliberative democracy and the widely popular 
mentalism of mainstream political psychology.  The emphasis of text- and practice-oriented 
approaches on the in-depth study of meaning and action in context makes them particularly 
sensitive to the combined influence of cultural inheritance and individual creativity, that realm of 
the social which tends to be badly captured in existing accounts.  Yet these new approaches will 
equally need to be handled with a good level of theoretical attentiveness, for they raise distinctive 
challenges of their own.  In the study of mass politics in particular, where the organising concept 
of ‘the people’ is especially open-ended in meaning, empiricists must be theorists as well, for 
conceptual choices continue to present themselves.  Without wanting to downplay the normative-
political character of these, it is likely that debates in social theory can be an important point of 
orientation. 
 
 
                                                 
 
Endnotes 
 
1
 A better term may therefore be lay politics, expressing the contrast to politics as a professionalised activity, but for 
reasons of brevity the more familiar vocabulary is used here. 
2
 The work of Marx and Weber contributes to both traditions.  We may set aside those ‘naturalist’ theories that see 
social structure in terms of social density (following the early Durkheim) or social ‘forms’ (following Simmel).  
3
 See e.g. (Fuchs and Klingemann 2000; Ester et al. 1993), works in the tradition pioneered by (Inglehart 1977).  
4
 E.g. (Lipset 1959; Verba and Nie 1972).  On ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions of rational choice, with their varying degrees 
of emphasis on the purely material world, see the overview in (Green and Shapiro 1994)  In common with all 
traditions, rational choice is not a bounded entity, and in its more interpretative forms – where ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’ and 
‘reasons’ are prominent – it merges with the mentalist approaches discussed later in this paper. 
5
 For defence of a pluralist standpoint, see (Fay 1996; Fay and Moon 1977). 
6
 For further discussion of the interpretative turn in social theorising, see (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Reckwitz 
2002; Sewell 1992; Hollis 1994; Taylor 1994).  
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7
 Early practitioners sometimes referred to themselves as ‘political behaviouralists’; however, for the purposes of this 
paper we shall consider their work a variation of political psychology, albeit one of the most central ones.  Political 
psychology has diversified somewhat in recent years – for an account which emphasises its pluralism see (Sullivan et 
al. 2002). 
8
 There are exceptions to this pattern of strong individualism in political psychology, notably where scholars draw on 
neighbouring disciplines such as social psychology and communications: e.g. (Iyengar 1991).  
9
 For good reason these are sometimes treated as distinct approaches (Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2001; Neumann 2002)  
However, while it is true that one version of textualism – the French structuralist kind associated with Saussure and 
Lévi-Strauss, which emphasises strongly determinative discourses at a macro level – is quite singular in its approach, 
for reasons of brevity, and in recognition of the common strand which the work of the later Wittgenstein represents, 
one may group practice-oriented theories with Anglo-Saxon textualist approaches, while acknowledging their 
differences on the centrality of language and the importance of non-propositional knowledge (cf. below).   
10
 Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology has been another important influence, as has discourse theory, emerging from 
post-structuralism and the language philosophy of the later Wittgenstein – an overview is (Howarth and Torfing 2005). 
11
 Before then, political psychology might have developed in a number of directions, perhaps following the more 
strongly interpretative approach of Robert E. Lane (Lane 1962). 
12
 The metaphor of the ‘frame’ is an interesting one: it asks us to think of the objects towards which attitudes are 
formed as being analogous to pictures, and contextual factors as analogous to the picture-frame and the picture’s 
setting more generally (neighbouring pictures, the play of sunlight, the art gallery itself, and so on).  In the view of art 
which the metaphor asks us to take up, there is a correct picture-frame, a correct set of neighbouring pictures, a correct 
play of sunlight, a correct art gallery, etc., and all other variations can only be treated as distortions.  This conception 
of art is not widely held, and raises doubts about the analogous conception of politics. 
13
 Arguably one of the weaknesses of structuralist textualism (see fnt. 9) is exactly that, by radically diminishing the 
role of the individual mind, it points to a closed symbolic system with little space for agency and change. 
14
 That the society-individual dualism is problematic has been long observed, yet from many social-theoretical 
perspectives it is hard to shake off (cf. (Dewey 1927, p.191; Schatzki 1996, chap. 1).  For a call to focus on the social 
rather than the individual or the societal, see (Barnes 2001, p.24). 
15
 Cf. the ‘duality of structure’ (Giddens 1984). 
16
 For the different positions taken by Habermas on these definitional questions, see (Cooke 2003).  Deliberative 
democracy, it should be acknowledged, has become a pluralised set of approaches and some of these emphasise the 
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non-necessity of consensus and the embeddedness of the reasoning process (c.f. (Dryzek 2000) chap. 3), but one may 
take the Habermasian approach still to represent the core of the intersubjectivist approach. 
17
 The same argument can be made of non-discursive kinds of social practice, or – as textualists might prefer – other 
kinds of social practice can be understood as languages too. 
18
 Of course, identifying relevant assumptions requires interpretation.  Analysis of this kind is no more a neutral 
exercise than any other form of empirical research – but it is better grounded than that which relies on hypothesising 
about invisible states of consciousness.  Cf. (Barnes 2001; Swidler 2001a) 
19
 (Sanders 1999).  Note also Lane’s use of interview methods.  
20
 For a review of the empirical work see (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Luskin et al. 2002; Conover et al. 2002)  
Highlighting the potential relevance of a quantitative technique, see (Dryzek 1990) on Q methodology. 
21
 On the group-interview method, see (Morgan 1997; Bloor et al. 2001)  
22
 See e.g. (Meinhof 2004). 
23
 Applying frame analysis to everyday discussion, see (Gamson 1992).  For empirical discourse analysis, see (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987) 
24
 Studying the logics of justification invoked in discussion of political problems, see (Perrin 2006)  Looking at the 
management of conflict in discussion, (Duchesne and Haegel 2007)  Note also the older idea of ‘vocabularies of 
motives’, understood as the (partly situation-specific) motives attributed to the self and others (Wright Mills 1940). 
25
 For some discussion of the various meanings of ‘qualitative research’, and the problems of equating it with ‘small 
N’ research, see (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, Introduction). 
26
 Discourse analysts vary on this question, depending on whether they locate power in the discourse or its 
manipulators, but Boltanski and Thévenot are explicitly sensitive to the selection of orders of worth, and Harré and 
Davies indicate ‘at least a possibility of notional choice’ (Davies and Harré 1990, p.45). 
27
 For some discussion, see (Swidler 2001b, pp.24ff.). 
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